CONTRACT LAW—ESTOPPING BIG BROTHER: THE CONSTITUTION, TOO, HAS SQUARE CORNERS by Holstrom, Stephen
Western New England Law Review
Volume 33 33 (2011)
Issue 1 Article 5
1-1-2011
CONTRACT LAW—ESTOPPING BIG
BROTHER: THE CONSTITUTION, TOO,
HAS SQUARE CORNERS
Stephen Holstrom
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen Holstrom, CONTRACT LAW—ESTOPPING BIG BROTHER: THE CONSTITUTION, TOO, HAS SQUARE CORNERS,
33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 163 (2011), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/5
 
 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE104.txt unknown Seq: 1  6-SEP-11 16:53 
NOTES
 
CONTRACT LAW—ESTOPPING  BIG  BROTHER: THE  CONSTITU­
TION, TOO, HAS SQUARE CORNERS1 
INTRODUCTION 
Equitable estoppel, also known as “estoppel in pais,”2 is a com­
mon law doctrine3 that “prevent[s] one party from taking unfair ad­
vantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the 
person to be estopped has induced another person to act in a cer­
tain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in 
some way.”4 
In order for a party to be equitably estopped, they 
must . . . :(1) . . . [make an affirmative] misrepresentation of fact 
to another person having reason to believe that the other [would] 
rely upon it; (2) the party seeking estoppel [must] rel[y] on [the 
misrepresentations] to its detriment; and (3) the reliance [must 
have been] reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did 
1. The title is taken from a well-known quote from the great Justice Holmes in 
Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v. United States where he emphasized that “[m]en must turn 
square corners when they deal with the Government.”  Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v. 
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). 
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (9th ed. 2009). 
3. Equitable estoppel is sometimes confused with promissory estoppel.  “Promis­
sory estoppel” creates a cause of action that enforces an illusory promise as a contract 
when no consideration exists, while equitable estoppel acts as a repellant to prevent a 
party from raising a defense it would have in the absence of this doctrine. Id. at 631. 
“Promissory estoppel is a sword, and equitable estoppel is a shield.” Jablon v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1054, 1068 (2d Cir. 1983). For further illustration, see Christopher S. 
Pugsley, The Game of “Who Can You Trust?”–Equitable Estoppel Against the Federal 
Government, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 101, 105 (2001); see also Mazer v. Jackson Ins. 
Agency, 340 So. 2d 770, 772-73 (Ala. 1976). 
Typically, equitable estoppel concerns a misrepresentation of past or present fact, 
while promissory estoppel concerns one of a future act. The distinction between the 
two types of estoppel is important because courts generally do not enforce claims of 
promissory estoppel against the government due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Jablon, 657 F.2d at 1070. 
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 630. R 
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not know nor should it have known that its adversary’s conduct 
was misleading.5 
While this doctrine has been invoked for hundreds of years 
among private litigants,6 courts still struggle mightily over if and 
when equitable estoppel should be applied against government 
action. 
Historically, equitable estoppel7 was not allowed against the 
government under any circumstance.8  The reasons for this are not 
without merit. These reasons  include: protecting the public fisc 
(and fears of the resulting crushing liability from the numerous law­
suits emanating from the immense level of communication between 
the government and its citizenry),9 preventing the infringement of 
the federal government’s sovereign immunity,10 avoiding schemes 
5. Mimiya Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 331 F.3d 178, 182 (1st 
Cir.  2003).  While these are the traditional elements of equitable estoppel, many courts 
have added that with regard to governmental acts, there must be an “affirmative mis­
conduct” on behalf of the governmental agent that is greater than mere negligence. See 
infra Part II.C. 
6. See Michael Cameron Pitou, Equitable Estoppel: Its Genesis, Development 
and Application in Government Contracting, 19 PUB. CONT. L.J. 606, 607 (1990) (stat­
ing that “[equitable estoppel’s] origins can be traced back to at least the Twelfth Cen­
tury in medieval England”). See also MELVIN M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF ESTOPPEL 1 (1872). 
7. Hereinafter “equitable estoppel” will be simply referred to as “estoppel” un­
less otherwise noted. 
8. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) 
(“[I]t is enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its 
officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be 
done what the law does not sanction or permit.”); Trs. of Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Exe­
ter, 27 A.2d 569, 586 (N.H. 1940) (“[T]he principle of sovereignty . . . would seem to 
defeat a claim of estoppel . . . .”). But see United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. 720, 735­
36 (1820); United States v. La Chappelle, 81 F. 152, 155 (C.C. Wash. 1897) (“The au­
thorities cited by counsel for the defendants prove that the doctrine of estoppel may be 
applied in some cases against the government.”). 
9. Fred Ansell, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule 
of Equitable Estoppel Against the Government, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026, 1027 (1986). 
10. This doctrine has been withering for decades. See, e.g., Portmann v. United 
States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1169 (7th Cir. 1982) ( “Sovereign immunity from contract and tort 
liability naturally carried with it sovereign immunity from equitable estoppel.”). The 
court also stated: “[a]s the doctrine of sovereign immunity eroded, it became necessary 
to offer other justifications for the government’s exemption from equitable estoppel.” 
Id. at 1159. See also United States v. Georgia-Pac. Co., 421 F.2d 92, 98-99 (9th Cir. 
1970) (“Sovereign immunity has been on the decline at both the state and federal level. 
It has been held generally that the Government is not subject to the same rules of 
property and estoppel as are private suitors.  Such governmental immunity from estop­
pel is an off-shoot of sovereign immunity.  Both the doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
that of governmental immunity from estoppel have been much discussed, criticized and 
limited in recent years.” (internal citations omitted)); State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands 
Comm’n v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“Modern times have 
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to defraud the government,11 and recognizing separation of powers 
principles.12  In recent times, however, courts have realized that a 
failure to estop the government in every instance can lead to grave 
injustices.13 
This Note will explore the legal history of equitable estoppel as 
it is applied to the government, including Supreme Court case law 
and subsequent interpretations by lower courts.  It will then ex­
amine the various issues created by the current unsettled state of 
the equitable estoppel doctrine in the governmental context, and 
how various commentators have proposed remedying these issues.14 
Next, it will recognize that there is no panacea; each of these reme­
dies are inadequate.15  Finally, this Note will put forth a new idea, 
which is gaining traction in some circles, that when deciding equita­
ble estoppel cases the government should apply each of these ap­
proaches in conjunction with each other, but with one additional 
element: when the government’s actions in effect allow it to sub­
stantially undermine the core legislative purpose of the Act in ques­
tion, the government should be estopped.16 
I. MODERN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL JURISPRUDENCE 
Realizing the potential for miscarriage of justice, the Supreme 
Court has consistently eschewed a bright line rule against estopping 
the government while refusing to adopt a test dictating when estop­
pel of this type is permitted.17  If little else is clear, “equitable es­
toppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private 
seen the erosion of sovereign immunity in its various forms, including immunity from 
the equitable defenses of the statute of limitations, laches and estoppel.”); Bernard 
Schwartz, Estoppel and Crown Privilege in English Administrative Law, 55 MICH. L. 
REV. 27, 27 (1957). 
11. See Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 368-69 (1813). 
12. David K. Thompson, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 551, 565 (1979). 
13. See infra Part I. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See infra Part. IV.A-B. 
17. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990) (“We 
leave for another day whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed against the Gov­
ernment.”); Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984) (“[W]e are hesi­
tant, when it is unnecessary to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which 
the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from es­
toppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum 
standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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litigants.”18  Because of a lack of guidance, Supreme Court prece­
dent provides ample opportunity for lower court interpretation in 
order to achieve their version of justice.19 
While in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has ad­
dressed cases implicating the issue of whether equitable estoppel 
should be applied against the government numerous times, the 
Court has squarely addressed the issue just four times. 
A. Cases Which Have Not Held the Government Estopped 
1. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill 
The first case in the modern era in which the Supreme Court 
addressed equitable estoppel’s applicability to the government 
found that ordinary recourse available for private litigants would 
not be available against the federal government. Federal Crop In­
surance Corp. v. Merrill20 involved a group of farmers who applied 
for insurance under the Federal Crop Insurance Act, seeking to in­
sure their fields against a poor harvest.21  The statute’s purpose was 
to protect wheat producers from financial catastrophe resulting 
from Acts of God.22  The farmers applied for insurance through the 
Bonneville County Agricultural Conservation Committee, a local 
agent for the federal government, telling the Committee that they 
were going to replant on land that had previously been a wheat 
field.23  The Committee informed the farmers that their crop was 
insurable, and they conveyed this to the federal government.24  The 
government approved.25 
18. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 419 (citing Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 
(1813)). 
19. See supra Part I.A. 
20. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). This case was dubbed 
“the leading case in our modern line of estoppel decisions” by Justice Kennedy in Rich­
mond, 496 U.S. at 420. 
21. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 382. 
22. This legislative purpose was clear to the court. 
To carry out the purposes of the Act, the Corporation, Commencing with the 
wheat . . . crops planted for harvest in 1945 is empowered to insure, upon such 
terms and conditions not inconsistent with the provisions of this title as it may 
determine, producers of wheat . . . against loss in yields due to unavoidable 
causes, including drought. 
Id. at 380 (alterations in original) (quotation marks in original to statutory material 
omitted). 
23. Id. at 382. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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Drought then struck the western states, and the farmers’ crop 
failed.26  When the farmers sought to collect, the government dis­
covered the crop had been reseeded, which prevented an insurance 
policy from being written.27  The farmers sued.28 
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Idaho ruled for 
the farmers, reasoning that since a private insurance company 
would be bound by its error, the federal government should be as 
well.29  The Supreme Court granted certiorari30 and reversed.31 
The Court first stated that the farmers would likely have a via­
ble cause of action against a private insurance company.32  How­
ever, the Court denied that the government was “just another 
private litigant” when it was engaged in business usually reserved 
for the free market.33  With little more, the Court stated that be­
cause of this, the government should not be estopped.34  The Court 
held that the farmers had constructive notice that their insurance 
policy was invalid because a regulation published in the Federal 
Register was explicit in that regard.35 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 382-83. 
30. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 331 U.S. 798 (1947). 
31. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 380. 
32. Id. at 383. 
33. Id. In fact, the Court pointed out that this government program existed be­
cause farmers like Merrill would not be able to obtain similar insurance on the private 
market. Id. at 384 n.1. 
34. Id. at 383.  More specifically, the Court stated: “It is too late in the day to urge 
that the Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with 
liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprise 
or engages in competition with private ventures.” Id.  As will be explained, courts have 
subsequently reconsidered this line of thinking and have reversed course. See infra Part 
II.A. 
35. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 383-86.  Here Justice Frankfurter echoed Justice Holmes 
when he said “[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.” 
Id. at 385.  To this, Justice Jackson tersely replied, “It is very well to say that those who 
deal with the Government should turn square corners.  But there is no reason why the 
square corners should constitute a one-way street.” Id. at 387-88.  Indeed Holmes’s 
quote has met stiff resistance in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 221 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice 
Holmes once said that ‘(m)en must turn square corners when they deal with the Gov­
ernment.’  I had always supposed this was a two-way street.” (alteration in original)); St. 
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“It is 
no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square cor­
ners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in deal­
ing with their Government.”); Comm’r v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“The revenue laws have become so complicated and intricate that I think 
the Government in moving against the citizen should also turn square corners.”). 
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Justice Jackson dissented, implicitly on equity grounds, stating: 
I would affirm the decision of the court below . . . .  I can see 
no reason why we should not adopt a rule which recognizes the 
practicalities of the business . . . .  [I]t is an absurdity to hold that 
every farmer who insures his crops knows what the Federal Reg­
ister contains or even knows that there is such a publication.  If 
he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is 
issued from time to time in order to make sure whether anything 
has been promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need 
crop insurance, for he would never get time to plant any crops. 
Nor am I convinced that a reading of technically-worded regula­
tions would enlighten him much in any event . . . one should not 
be expected to have to employ a lawyer to see whether his own 
Government is issuing him a policy which in case of loss would 
turn out to be no policy at all.36 
Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s sentiments, protection of the 
government’s interest and regulatory authority were paramount in 
the majority’s decision.37  This precedent would only become, if an­
ything, strengthened by later Supreme Court rulings. 
2. Schweiker v. Hansen 
In Schweiker v. Hansen, the Supreme Court stated the general 
rule that in order for the government to have been estopped, the 
agent must have engaged in “affirmative misconduct,” but stopped 
short of articulating what particular activity would constitute such 
conduct.38  In Schweiker, a Social Security Administration (SSA) 
field representative offered flawed advice to a recently widowed 
mother.39  Hansen asked a representative at her local SSA field of­
fice if she was eligible for “mother’s insurance benefits.”40  The rep­
resentative told her that she was not eligible, and she did not file a 
written application pursuant to this advice, despite the fact that an 
SSA manual instructed representatives to tell applicants to fill out 
36. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 386-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson then ad­
vocated for a sweeping rule authorizing the use of estoppel against the government 
stating that the Court should “lay[ ] down a federal rule that would hold these agencies 
to the same fundamental principles of fair dealing that have been found essential in 
progressive states to prevent insurance from being an investment in disappointment.” 
Id. at 388. 
37.  Id. at 383-86. 
38.  See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 787-88 (1982) (per curiam). See infra 
note 132 and accompanying text. R 
39. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 786. 
40. Id. 
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applications even if they believed the applicant ineligible.41  Hansen 
discovered a year later that she was in fact eligible.42  She then com­
pleted the necessary paperwork and began receiving benefits, which 
provided for a year’s benefits awarded retroactively.43  Had she fil­
led out an application when she originally sought advice, she would 
have been eligible for a year’s worth of benefits awarded retroac­
tively at that time.44  After a series of administrative rulings against 
Hansen, she sued for the year’s benefits she did not receive due to 
the representative’s faulty advice.45 
The trial court ruled for Hansen, and the Second Circuit af­
firmed,46 holding that “misinformation provided by a Government 
official combined with a showing of misconduct (even if it does not 
rise to the level of a violation of a legally binding rule) should be 
sufficient to require estoppel.”47  Additionally, the court pointed 
out that “[a]ppellee was at all times ‘substantively’ eligible in the 
sense that she was in the class of people that Congress intended to 
benefit.  It would fulfill the fundamental legislative goal to grant 
appellee the benefits she seeks.”48 
The Supreme Court reversed, not on the grounds that it was 
inappropriate to estop the government in any case,49 but only that it 
was inappropriate in this case particularly.50  The Court found that 
the field representative’s failure to instruct Hansen to file an appli­
cation (rather than, for example, preventing her from filing) fell 
“far short” of the conduct that would require estoppel of the gov­
ernment.51  The Court also voiced concerns about the potential for 
crushing liability against the government if the circuit court’s deci­
sion stood.52  Such liability would subject innumerable conversa­
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 787. 
45. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 946 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker, 
450 U.S. 785. 
46. See generally id. (holding that Hansen justifiably relied on the Government’s 
conduct, which was unjustifiable). 
47. Id. at 948. 
48. Id. 
49. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 788.  “This Court has never decided what type of con­
duct by a Government employee will estop the Government from insisting upon com­
pliance with valid regulations governing the distribution of welfare benefits.” Id. 
50. Id. at 790. 
51. Id. at 789-90. 
52. Id. 
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tions between field representatives and citizens to scrutiny where 
representatives did not precisely follow the lengthy SSA manual.53 
Two justices dissented, calling attention to the fact that the ma­
jority appeared to hastily overrule the court of appeals with little 
factual basis to do so.54  The dissenting justices wrote of the impro­
priety of the court’s issuance of a per curiam order in a case where 
the law was far from settled.  In their view, the ruling would only 
serve to confusion among the lower courts.55 
3.	 Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford 
County 
Just two years after Hansen the Supreme Court again ex­
amined this issue in Heckler v. Community Health Services of Craw-
ford County.56  The Court held that the federal government was not 
estopped from recovering federal funds from a nonprofit provider 
of health care services, despite the provider having been told orally 
by the government that the expenditures were proper.57  The Court 
ruled that the provider had not demonstrated that the traditional 
elements of an estoppel were present, namely that money was im­
properly disbursed to Heckler in the first instance.  As a result, 
Heckler could not have detrimentally relied on any government ad­
vice.58  Heckler’s position had not changed.59  Recall, an estoppel 
53.	 Id. 
54.	 Id. at 791 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
55. In the words of the dissenting justices: 
The apparent message of today’s decision—that we will know an estoppel 
when we see one—provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts in an 
area of the law that, contrary to the majority’s view, is far from settled . . . .  I 
believe that the majority, in its haste to reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, has simply added confusion to an already unsettled area by hinting, 
but not deciding, that various factual nuances may be dispositive of estoppel 
claims against the Government. 
Id. at 792-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
This view was prescient.  The confusion is exacerbated by the belief that “the doc­
trine of equitable estoppel does apply to the government” as a result of the “almost 
uniform support of decisions of the 1970s.” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 17.01, at 399 (1976).  A few short years after Mr. Davis wrote 
this, the Supreme Court hastily overturned the Second Circuit, suggesting this was a 
settled area of law.  However, the Court expressly recognized in its opinion that equita­
ble estoppel was not settled. See infra Part I.A.4. 
56.	 Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984). 
57.	 See id. at 53. 
58.	 Id. at 62. 
59. Id. at 59 (“[T]he party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its adver­
sary’s conduct ‘in such a manner as to change his position for the worse.’”) (quoting 3 J. 
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 805, at 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941)). 
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may not occur even in a private context when these required ele­
ments are not present.60 
In dicta, the Court refused to place an absolute prohibition on 
estoppel against the government, noting that there were indeed 
cases in which the government should be estopped, albeit only 
under a special set of circumstances left relatively undefined.61  Pur­
suant to this language, a number of lower courts subsequently al­
lowed estoppel against the government.62 
4. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond 
In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, the plaintiff 
was a welder for the Navy who had problems with his eyesight and 
could no longer perform his duties.63  He was given a disability an­
nuity yearly and honorably discharged.64  The statute regulating dis­
ability pay for government employees stated that if he was restored 
60. Id. at 61. 
61. The Court explained: 
When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct 
of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a 
whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined . . . .  Petitioner urges us 
to expand this principle into a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circum­
stances run against the Government.  We have left the issue open in the past, 
and do so again today.  Though the arguments the Government advances for 
the rule are substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary to decide this 
case, to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that 
the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed 
by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of de­
cency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government. 
Id. at 60-61.  The Court also noted that “the hallmark of the [equitable estoppel] doc­
trine is its flexible application.” Id. at 59. 
62. Dicta such as this may have first appeared in Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 
308, 314-15 (1961) (“[M]isconduct . . . might prevent the United States from relying on 
petitioner’s foreign birth.  In this situation, we need not stop to inquire whether, as 
some lower courts have held, there may be circumstances in which the United States is 
estopped . . . .”).  This dicta is typical of subsequent Supreme Court cases. For an exam­
ple of lower courts following this dicta, see Watkins v. U.S. Army, in which the court 
stated that: 
The Supreme Court has expressly left open the issue whether estoppel 
may run against the government, refusing to hold “that there are no cases in 
which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law 
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citi­
zens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their 
dealings with their Government.” . . . This is a case where equity cries out and 
demands that the Army be estopped. 
Watkins v.  U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Heckler, 467 U.S. 
at 60-61)  (holding the government estopped). 
63. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 416 (1990). 
64. Id. 
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to his former earning capacity, he could no longer collect disabil­
ity.65  “Restored” for the plaintiff meant having a job that paid him 
eighty percent of his old welding salary.66  He then took a job as a 
school bus driver.67  He was offered overtime and called the Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM) inquiring how much overtime he 
could work and still collect disability.68  They responded with an 
erroneously high number, and Richmond worked that number.69 
The OPM discontinued his benefits; Richmond appealed.70 
The United States Supreme Court decided the case on consti­
tutional grounds,71 holding that the plaintiff’s claim for money was 
in direct contravention to the statute on which his claim must rest.72 
Estopping the government in this and similar situations was held to 
be violative of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, which in 
the plurality’s73 view must be interpreted to mean that “[h]owever 
much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of 
it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanc­
tioned [by Congress].”74  Thus, the Court created a bright line rule 
that the government cannot be estopped when the plaintiff is seek­
ing a money claim from the government, unless Congress consents 
to such an action through legislation.75  Such an estoppel would vio­
65. 5 U.S.C. § 8337(d) (2006); Richmond, 496 U.S. at 417. 
66. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 417. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 417-18. 
70. Id. at 418. 
71. “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appro­
priations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See generally Paul F. Figley, The 
Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1207 (2009). 
72. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8337 (2006)). 
73. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia wrote for the majority 
with Justices Blackmun and White concurring. Id. at 15.  Justice Stevens concurred 
only in judgment. Id.  Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Id. 
74. Id. at 425 (quoting Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 291 (1851)). The Court 
then continued: 
[I]f the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right to them has so far 
become vested in the United States that they can only be secured to the for­
mer owner of the property through an act of Congress.  Moneys once in the 
treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law. . . . [J]udicial use 
of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant respondent a money remedy 
that Congress has not authorized. 
Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted). 
75. Id. at 434.  This rule was only advocated by the three justice plurality. Justices 
Blackmun and White took issue with some of the Court’s spending analysis, while Jus­
tice Stevens stated that “[t]he Appropriations Clause of the Constitution has nothing to 
do with this case.  Payments of pension benefits to retired and disabled federal servants 
are made ‘in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law’ even if in particular cases 
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late the Appropriations Clause, since it would be tantamount to the 
court forcing the government to pay funds that Congress never ap­
propriated; the court would impermissibly be drafting laws from the 
bench.76  However, some lower courts have interpreted Richmond’s 
holding to be much narrower.77 
The Court also addressed whether a flat rule denying estoppel 
against the government should exist, and again declined to make 
such a rule:78 
But it remains true that we need not embrace a rule that no es­
toppel will lie against the Government in any case in order to 
decide this case.  We leave for another day whether an estoppel 
claim could ever succeed against the Government.  A narrower 
ground of decision is sufficient to address the type of suit 
presented here, a claim for payment of money from the Public 
Treasury contrary to a statutory appropriation.79 
This passage is reminiscent of those present in other rulings 
concerning equitable estoppel against the government.  In each in­
stance that the court has addressed the estoppel issue, it has dis-
they are the product of a mistaken interpretation of a statute.” Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
The dissenting justices felt that the Appropriations Clause should not stand in the 
way of a litigant’s attempt to collect funds from the government after it had been equi­
tably estopped. 
Although the Constitution generally forbids payments from the Treasury with­
out a congressional appropriation, that proposition does not resolve this case. 
Most fundamentally, Richmond’s collection of disability benefits would be 
fully consistent with the relevant appropriation.  And even if the majority is 
correct that the statute cannot be construed to appropriate funds for claimants 
in Richmond’s position, petitioner may nonetheless be estopped, on the basis 
of its prelitigation conduct, from arguing that the Appropriations Clause bars 
his recovery.  Both the statutory construction and the estoppel arguments turn 
on the equities, and the equities favor Richmond. 
Id. at 437-38 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d 
1574, 1581 (Fed Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Claims Court erred in concluding that Richmond 
stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for 
any monetary claim. The Richmond holding is not so broad. Richmond is limited to 
‘claim[s] for the payment of money from the Public Treasury contrary to a statutory 
appropriation.’”); see also United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[Plaintiff]’s assertion of equitable estoppel . . . would have a negative impact on the 
public fisc . . . this fact alone does not suffice to implicate the rule announced in 
Richmond.”). 
78. Although the Supreme Court has refused to estop the government in the 
cases set forth here, they have held the government estopped (albeit under different 
doctrinal labels). See infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2. 
79. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 423-24. 
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posed of the claim on narrow grounds while declining to address 
the situations in which the government should be estopped, aside 
from imposing the affirmative misconduct requirement. 
B.	 Cases in Which the Court May Have Held the Government 
Estopped 
1.	 Moser v. United States 
In Moser v. United States, the petitioner was a Swiss national 
who immigrated to the United States in 1937.80  He registered with 
the Selective Service Agency in 1940, and then returned to Switzer­
land to serve in the Swiss military.81  Following his service in Swit­
zerland, he returned to the United States and married a U.S. 
citizen, fathering three children with her.82  On January 11, 1944 he 
was declared eligible for the draft.83  He sought aid from the Swiss 
Legation, claiming that under the Treaty of 1850 he did not have to 
join the U.S. military.84  At the time this deal was allowed under the 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, with the proviso that if 
one exercised this right they could not become a United States citi­
zen.85  After contacting the Swiss Legation, Moser informed the Lo­
cal Board of the Selective Service Administration that he had been 
“released unconditionally” from military service pursuant to the 
treaty.86  After receiving Moser’s request, the Legation asked the 
U.S. State Department to grant Moser this unconditional release.87 
The Department then referred the matter to Moser’s Local Board, 
which replied that Moser must complete a Form 301 which was re­
vised to comply with the Treaty.88  This would grant him a draft 
deferral.89  The Form was revised to exclude the provision that read 
“I understand that the making of this application to be relieved 
from such liability will debar me from becoming a citizen of the 
United States”; language in conflict with the Treaty of 1850.90 
Moser also received written assurances from the Swiss legation that 
80.	 Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 42 (1951). 
81.	 Id. 
82.	 Id. 
83.	 Id. 
84. The Treaty of 1850 provided that nationals of the United States and Switzer­
land living in the opposite country were exempt from military service there. Id. 
85.	 Id. at 42-43; see also 50 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1940). 
86.	 Moser, 341 U.S. at 43. 
87.	 Id. 
88.	 Id. 
89.	 Id. 
90.	 Id. at 44. 
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he would be allowed to apply for citizenship if he did not serve.91 
Shortly thereafter, he applied for citizenship and was denied.92  The 
Naturalization Service claimed he obtained Form 301 through 
fraudulent mechanisms and in any event, that the Selective Service 
Act superseded the Treaty of 1850.93  He sued, and in a sharply 
worded opinion the district court held for Moser.94  However, this 
ruling was reversed by the Second Circuit, which held that while the 
Treaty of 1850 allowed Moser an exemption from military service, it 
did not force the United States to grant him citizenship simply be­
cause he had made this decision to take advantage of the 
exemption.95 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that 
Moser did not intelligently waive his rights.96  The Court also held, 
like the district court, that if Moser believed he would be prevented 
from obtaining citizenship by bypassing the draft, he would have 
served in the American military.97 
2. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. 
United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. 
(PICCO) was a case in which the United States prosecuted PICCO 
for violating 13 U.S.C. § 407, which was enacted in 1899.98  The stat­
ute prohibited dumping industrial refuse into navigable water­
91. Id. at 43-44. 
92. Id. 
93. Petition of Moser, 85 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (D.N.Y. 1949). 
94. Id. at 685. 
[T]o me it seems that verbal gymnastics in this case become quite irrelevant. 
Nothing could be clearer than the fact that our own State Department recog­
nized the immunity that Moser had under the treaty.  Nor could anything be 
plainer, to me at least, than the fact that Moser never would have signed the 
revised form D.S.S. 301 if it were to be treated as a waiver of naturalization in 
the future . . . .  I find as a fact that there never was a waiver of naturalization 
by Moser and that the petition should be granted. 
Id. 
95. Petition of Moser, 182 F.2d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 1950) (“Even if ‘right to apply 
for’ can be stretched to be synonymous with ‘right to obtain’ citizenship that would not 
bind this government.”). 
96. Moser, 341 U.S. at 47 (holding that “nothing less than an intelligent waiver is 
required by elementary fairness”).  In reality, the Court dismissed the estoppel issue in 
a rather cursory manner, stating, “[t]here is no need to evaluate these circumstances on 
the basis of any estoppel of the Government or the power of the Swiss Legation to bind 
the United States by its advice to petitioner.  Petitioner did not knowingly and inten­
tionally waive his rights to citizenship.” Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006). 
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ways.99  Section 407 also provided that “‘the Secretary of the Army 
. . . may permit the deposit’ of refuse matter deemed by the Army 
Corps of Engineers not to be injurious to navigation, ‘provided ap­
plication is made to [the Secretary] prior to depositing such mate­
rial.’”100  PICCO dumped waste products into a river without 
seeking a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers, but this was 
because no permit program was established until December of 
1970, seventy-one years after Section 407 was enacted.101 
At trial, the district court refused to admit evidence both that 
the permit program was not in existence at the time of the alleged 
offenses and that the Army Corps of Engineers misled PICCO to 
believe that a permit was not needed for Section 407 compliance.102 
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, which held that the 
Section 13 prohibition was operative in the absence of the requisite 
formalized permit procedures.103 
Relevant to estoppel, the Supreme Court held the district 
court’s refusal to admit PICCO’s evidence to be erroneous, explain­
ing that this prevented PICCO from mounting an adequate de­
fense.104  In addition, the Court noted that the Army Corps of 
Engineers had always interpreted Section 407 to apply to industrial 
effluents that obstruct waterways, not refuse that caused no harm to 
ships in transit.105  The Court further remarked that it was correct 
for PICCO to look for the Army Corps of Engineers regulations for 
guidance.106  The Court then held, “Thus, to the extent that the reg­
ulations deprived PICCO of fair warning as to what conduct the 
Government intended to make criminal, we think there can be no 
doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of 
99. Id. 
100. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 658 (1973) (quoting 
original statute codified at § 13, the Court notes that the Secretary’s authority to issue 
permits under § 13 was terminated on October 18, 1972); 33 U.S.C. § 407. 
101. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 660 n.9. 
102. Id. at 661. 
103. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 476 (3d Cir. 1972). 
104. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 670. 
105. The regulations stated: “Section 13 of the River and Harbor Act of March 3, 
1899 authorizes the Secretary of the Army to permit the deposit of refuse matter in 
navigable waters, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and 
navigation will not be injured thereby . . . .” Id. at 673 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.200(e)(2) 
(1969)). 
106. Id. at 674. 
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criminal justice prevent the Government from proceeding with the 
prosecution.”107 
Many commentators have expressed the view that Moser and 
PICCO were cases decided on equitable estoppel grounds despite 
the fact that the Court did not say so expressly.108  These scholars 
reason that the situations presented were decisions in which the es­
toppel doctrine could have readily been invoked.109  Indeed, the 
lower court decisions in both cases spoke about estoppel as it ap­
plied to these litigants.110 
It appears that confusion about the precedential value of these 
decisions befuddles even the justices themselves.  In Richmond, 
Justice White wrote “[PICCO] may well have been decided on the 
basis of estoppel.”111  Likewise, in Heckler Justice Rehnquist 
seemed similarly confused about the Supreme Court’s sanction of 
the use of estoppel.112 
107. Id.  The Court then cited two law review articles about the application of 
equitable estoppel against the government, supporting the view of some commentators 
that the Court had equitable estoppel in mind when rendering this decision. Id.; see 
Frank C. Newman, Note, Should Official Advice Be Reliable? —Proposals as to Estop­
pel and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953); Note, 
Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L. J. 1046 (1969). 
108. See, e.g., Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Ob­
ject: Estoppel Remedies for an Agency’s Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Mis­
conduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653, 730 (1992) (“In PICCO, as in Moser, the problem for 
the scholar is to account for the dramatically different approach used by the Court to 
address what is analytically an estoppel problem.”); Frederick W. Blumenschein, Note, 
Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 423, 435 (1981). 
109. See Schwartz, supra note 108, at 730; Blumenschein, supra note 108, at 435 R 
n.50. 
110. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 480 (3d Cir. 
1972), rev’d, 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); Petition of Moser, 182 F.2d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 
1950), rev’d sub nom.  Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 47 (1951).  Of course, one 
reason the Court may not have couched the decision in estoppel terms is to prevent 
future litigants from pointing to these decisions as Supreme Court acceptance of the 
invocation of the doctrine. 
111. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434 (1990) (White, J., 
concurring). 
112. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 61 
n.12 (1984) (“In fact, at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the 
Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm 
a private party as a result of governmental deception.”); see also Nagle v. Acton-
Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
almost never estopped the government–outside of criminal cases or deportation.”); 
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1973) (“We think the 
estoppel doctrine is applicable to the United States where justice and fair play require 
it. The Supreme Court applied this rationale in Moser v. United States . . . .”); Griffin v. 
Reich, 956 F.Supp. 98, 107 (D. R.I 1997) (discussing how PICCO and Moser may have 
been decided on equitable estoppel grounds). Contra Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 
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II.	 SUGGESTED WAYS TO TREAT EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
Addressing the ambiguity created by the Supreme Court, com­
mentators have proposed various techniques to prevent most cir­
cumstances of grave injustice, but which also seek to avoid many of 
the negative effects associated with estopping the government. The 
following section analyzes and synthesizes the views of these 
commentators. 
A. Proprietary Capacity 
Many courts and commentators have suggested that when the 
federal government is acting in its proprietary function,113 it is act­
ing much the same as private market participants and therefore 
should be estopped like a private entity.114  There are two ways in 
which the government acts in a proprietary capacity. The first in­
volves a situation where the federal government is providing an es­
sential service because there is not a strong enough profit potential 
for private actors to do so.115  The second is when it is essentially 
competing like other private actors.116 
There are plentiful and often straightforward justifications for 
estopping the government in these situations.  Obviously, it is law­
ful for private parties to be estopped in instances where their con­
duct satisfies the elements of equitable estoppel. When the 
government acts in this manner, it is at no greater a risk of incurring 
liability than the private litigant.  For example, Fed Ex and the 
950 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 
U.S. 785 (1982) (“While some courts and commentators have sought to find a contrary 
indication [that the Supreme Court did hold the government estopped] in Moser v. 
United States, this is an instance of the wish being father to the thought.”). 
113. As opposed to its “sovereign” function. See John F. Conway, Note, Equita­
ble Estoppel of the Federal Government: An Application of the Proprietary Function 
Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 707 (1987). 
114. For an example of this view, see United States v. Georgia Pacific Co., 421 
F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970) (“The growth of government and the concomitant increase in its 
functions, power and contacts with private parties has made many courts increasingly 
reluctant to deny the defense of equitable estoppel in appropriate situations.”). The 
court then held the government could be estopped because it was seeking enforcement 
of a contract made with a private party. Id. at 100.  That is, the parties’ relationship was 
substantially similar to those of two private parties contracting. Id. 
115. This is often referred to as “proprietary in form.” See Conway, supra note 
113, at 720.  Government operation of Amtrak is an example of “proprietary in form” R 
action. 
116. This is often referred to as “proprietary in fact.” Id. at 720.  An example of 
this is the United States Postal Service. Id. at 720. 
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United Parcel Service both have extensive, nationwide operations 
with many agents, perhaps more so than the United States Postal 
Service.  There are likely comparable opportunities for the Postal 
Service and these private carriers to incur liability.  In the view of 
proponents advocating the proprietary exception to the longstand­
ing doctrine against estoppel of the government, it is fundamentally 
unfair if the government can escape liability while private carriers 
are left paying damages for similar acts. 
Many of these reasons have been judicially recognized for at 
least the past eighty years.117  The “proprietary capacity” idea has 
increasingly gained acceptance.118  Of course, not all courts have 
followed this model.119 
B. Procedural Estoppel 
Numerous courts and other observers have also noted a differ­
ence between estopping the government’s conduct by demanding it 
to provide a benefit to the plaintiff that they were never in fact 
entitled to receive, and estopping the government when it did not 
follow its own rules and regulations.120  The latter is known as “pro­
cedural” rather than “substantive” estoppel.121 Merrill provides an 
example of substantive estoppel where claimants sought to invoke 
estoppel to recover insurance benefits to which they believed they 
were entitled as a result of government miscommunication.122 
117. The Falcon, 19 F.2d 1009, 1014 (D. Md. 1927) (“Estoppels against the public 
are perhaps not as readily granted as against private individuals, but it has been decided 
frequently that the public may estop itself by acts done in its proprietary capacity . . . . 
[W]hen a sovereignty submits itself to the jurisdiction of a court of equity . . . its claims 
and rights are adjudicable by every other principle and rule of equity applicable to the 
claims and rights of private parties under similar circumstances.”). 
118. Accord Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 682 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1982) (find­
ing issuance of permits for developers’ dredge and fill activities is unquestionably an 
exercise of  the government’s sovereign power and therefore not subject to estoppel); 
see also Meister Bros. v. Macy, 674 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding equitable 
estoppel may lie against government when agency was engaged in essentially a private 
business); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding 
proprietary character of government activity militates in favor of allowing estoppel). 
See generally Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Precision Small Engines, 227 F.3d 224, 
228 (4th Cir. 2000). 
119. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102, 1108 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(finding no merit in argument that proprietary nature of government activity justifies 
assertion of equitable estoppel against it); see also Phelps v. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency, 
785 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1986). 
120. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 113, at 707. R 
121. Id. at 717-19. 
122. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). 
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There, the farmers sought the proceeds on their crop insurance, a 
benefit that they were never actually entitled to, yet believed they 
were because they were informed by the FCIC that their crop was 
insurable.123 
Schweiker v. Hansen was an example of a procedural estoppel 
claim.124  The Second Circuit in Hansen v. Harris ruled that the 
plaintiff should not bear the costs of the SSA’s errors because the 
SSA officer’s misconduct resulted from a failure to follow clearly 
written guidelines in the SSA field representative’s manual.125  Had 
the field representative followed these guidelines, Hansen would 
have received the benefits to which she was entitled.126  Because 
the government agent’s failure to follow clearly promulgated guide­
lines resulted in an injustice to the private litigant, the Second Cir­
cuit held the government estopped.127 
Proponents of this view favor estopping the government when 
it commits a procedural error because claimants are denied benefits 
that they are actually entitled to through no fault of their own.128 
In addition, Congress purposefully allocated resources for people in 
the benefit-receiving class, thus showing a congressional belief that 
it is socially desirable that members of that class receive these bene­
fits.129  A policy that essentially results in permitting government 
agents to ignore rules frustrates the congressional purpose of pro­
viding benefits to people like Hansen.130  Finally, failing to estop 
the government in cases such as this encourages laziness and lacka­
daisical behavior, and diminishes accountability in communication 
123. Id. at 382-83. 
124. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1982); see supra notes 39-51 and accom- R 
panying text. 
125. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. R 
126. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. R 
127. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker, 
450 U.S. at 790 (“[O]ur holding of estoppel under these circumstances is limited to the 
situation where (a) a procedural not a substantive requirement is involved and (b) an 
internal procedural manual or guide or some other source of objective standards of 
conduct exists and supports an inference of misconduct by a Government employee.”). 
The Supreme Court rejected this rationale in Schweiker. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 788. 
128. See generally Peter Raven-Hansen, Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their 
Own “Laws”, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
129. Hansen, 619 F.2d at 962 (Newman, J., concurring), rev’d sub nom. 
Schweiker, 450 U.S. 785 (stating that estopping the government  in this case “does not 
drain the public fisc of one dollar that is being spent either in excess of anticipated 
benefit levels or contrary to a substantive policy decision of the Congress”). 
130. Id. at 948 (majority opinion). 
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between government officials and the citizenry, threatening public 
trust in their government.131 
C. Affirmative Misconduct 
In yet another attempt to develop an approach that would pre­
vent injustice while remaining cognizant of the concerns underlying 
the general rule against estopping the government, most courts 
have held that the government may only be estopped when its 
agent engages in some sort of “affirmative misconduct.”132  Mere 
negligence will not suffice to estop the government.133 
It is often difficult to determine what sort of conduct consti­
tutes “affirmative misconduct.”  Courts usually determine if con­
duct is “affirmative” on a case-by-case basis, and have refused to set 
forth a definite test.134  Indeed, some courts have held that the gov­
ernment may not be estopped procedurally because failure to fol­
low internal guidelines does not constitute affirmative 
misconduct.135 
Supreme Court case law supports the affirmative misconduct 
requirement.  The Court first touched on the affirmative miscon­
duct requirement in Montana v. Kennedy.136  In Kennedy, the peti­
tioner had an American-born mother and an Italian father.137  He 
was born while his parents were temporarily living in Italy.138  Prior 
to his birth, an American Consular Officer told his mother that she 
could not return to the United States because she was pregnant, 
and the United States did not issue passports to pregnant wo­
men.139  However, the U.S. did not require that citizens have pass­
ports when they were returning to the U.S. at the time of the 
131. See generally Raven-Hansen, supra note 128, at 73-75. R 
132. See, e.g., INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Montana v. Ken­
nedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961). 
133. See de la Fuente v. F.D.I.C., 332 F.3d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003). 
134. See, e.g., Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 241 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that “[The Supreme Court’s] opinions have mentioned the possibility that some 
type of affirmative governmental conduct might give rise to estoppel” (emphasis ad­
ded)).  At the very most, courts have employed guidance similar to that stated in Pur­
cell v. United States. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. R 
135. See Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 976 F.2d 934, 938 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (stating that “‘more than mere negligence, delay, inaction, or failure to fol­
low an internal agency guideline’” is required for establishing an equitable estoppel 
claim (quoting Mangaroo v. Nelson, 864 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1989))). 
136. Kennedy, 366 U.S. at 308. 
137. Id. at 309. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 314. 
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petitioner’s birth.140  Petitioner sought, inter alia, to estop the gov­
ernment from denying birth citizenship because of this misrepresen­
tation.141  The Court ruled that the officer’s faulty advice142 “falls 
far short of misconduct such as might prevent the United States 
from relying on petitioner’s foreign birth.”143 
Twelve years after Kennedy, INS v. Hibi144 involved the pas­
sage of a 1940 statute through which a Philippine-born serviceman 
sought benefits.145  The Act allowed for foreign-born members of 
the U.S. military to be granted citizenship without requiring them 
to undergo residency and literacy requirements they would other­
wise need.146 
Seventeen years after the application deadline passed, peti­
tioner’s visa expired.147  He argued that the government failed to 
provide a naturalization representative in the Philippines, or publi­
cize this benefit to servicemen in any way.148  The Court held that 
this too fell short of the affirmative misconduct needed to estop the 
government.149 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. The officer simply stated, “I am sorry, Mrs., you cannot [return to the United 
States] in that condition.” Id. at 314. 
143. Id. at 314-15. 
144. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam). 
145. Id. at 6, 8; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002, 1005 (repealed 1952). 
146. Nationality Act of 1940 § 701, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 (repealed 1952); see also Hibi, 
414 U.S. at 7 n.8. 
147. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 7. 
148. Id. at 8. 
149. Id. at 8-9. Accord INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam).  In Mi­
randa, a foreign-born man had married a naturalized U.S. citizen. Id. at 14.  At the 
time of the marriage, respondent’s wife filed a visa petition with the INS on respon­
dent’s behalf requesting that he be granted an immigrant visa as her spouse. Id. at 15. 
Miranda also filed an application requesting the INS to adjust his status to that of a 
permanent resident alien. Id.  The INS took no action for eighteen months. Id.  Re­
spondent’s marriage failed, and his ex-wife withdrew her application. Id.  When re­
spondent’s application was then processed, it was denied “because he had not shown an 
immigrant visa was . . . available to him.” Id. 
An immigration judge ordered Miranda deported. Id. at 15-16.  He appealed, and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals judge denied his estoppel claim, reasoning the gov­
ernment’s actions were not an affirmative misconduct. Id. at 16.  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, stating they believed the government’s actions were affirmative. Id.  The Su­
preme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the circuit court in light 
of their opinion in Hansen. Id.  The Ninth Circuit again ruled that the government’s 
misconduct was affirmative, and the Supreme Court again disagreed. Id. at 19. 
183 
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Justice Douglas’s dissent150 viewed the facts very differently, 
focusing on some facts that he felt the Court had ignored.151  The 
failure to provide a naturalization agent was not an omission by the 
government.152  Instead, it was the consequence of an act taken by 
the Executive Branch.  The Filipino government feared the applica­
tion of the provision of the Serviceman’s Act that authorized natu­
ralization of those Filipinos who served alongside U.S. soldiers in 
the Second World War into the United States.153  The Filipino gov­
ernment feared that young men, upon gaining American citizen­
ship, would flee the country.  They asked the Attorney General to 
revoke the Vice-Consul’s authority to naturalize Filipino ex-service­
men, and he so allowed.154  This left no naturalization representa­
tive in the Philippines to enforce the Congressional mandate that 
these Filipino soldiers have the opportunity to become U.S. citi­
zens, even though Congress clearly intended for naturalization 
agents to be present in the Philippines to naturalize these men.155 
Hibi could not have been naturalized even had he known about the 
program, or if he had tried.156  In Justice Douglas’s view, this be­
havior constituted a “deliberate—and successful—effort on the part 
of agents of the Executive Branch to frustrate the congressional 
purpose and to deny substantive rights to Filipinos such as respon­
dent by administrative fiat.”157  Justice Douglas then noted, “The 
record does not support [the] conclusion,” apparently reached by 
the majority, “that there was no affirmative misconduct involved in 
this case.”158 
Naturally, an “affirmative” misconduct requirement serves to 
defray endless liability concerns.  Negligence in communication 
usually involves a misunderstanding by the party relying on the 
communication.  That is, the communicator said something in a way 
that caused a second party to misunderstand, while the communica­
tor had a good faith belief that the second party’s understanding 
was correct.  Conversely, courts often find “affirmative misconduct” 
when the government has reason to believe it has communicated 
150. Joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 9-11 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 10-11. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 11. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
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misinformation, and has done so as part of an ongoing series of 
misrepresentations or distortions against the suing party.159  How­
ever, many courts have found that affirmative misconduct by the 
government can occur even without the intent to mislead.160 
D. Actual Authority 
As a general rule, the government cannot be estopped when a 
particular agent is acting outside the scope of his authority.161  This 
is true where the agent’s authority is apparent or clearly ultra 
vires.162  In fact, many courts have held that a government agent 
may never be bound by apparent authority, because any agent of 
the government would always appear to have authority, at least to 
an unsophisticated party.163  Apparent authority is, therefore, too 
dependent on the private litigant’s subjective belief.164  The scope 
of a government agent’s authority is critical because the existence 
of actual authority is a prerequisite to equitably estopping the 
government.165 
159. See Purcell v. United States, 1 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1993).  “Affirmative 
misconduct involves ‘ongoing active misrepresentations’ or a ‘pervasive pattern of false 
promises’” as opposed to “an isolated act of providing misinformation.” Id. (quoting 
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 708 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
160. See, e.g., Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707 (citing Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 
1064, 1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)); Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 573 F. 
Supp. 2d 311, 327 (D. Me. 2008), aff’d, 585 F.3d 495 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Watkins, 875 
F.2d at 707 (en banc)). 
161. This rule has been in existence for hundreds of years. See Lee v. Munroe, 7 
Cranch 366, 367 (1813) (“[The] United States is not bound by the declarations of their 
agent, founded upon a mistake of fact, unless it clearly appears that the agent was act­
ing within the scope of his authority, and was empowered in his capacity of agent to 
make such declaration.”). 
162. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70 (1940) (“An officer or agency of 
the United States to whom no administrative authority has been delegated cannot estop 
the United States even by an affirmative undertaking to waive or surrender a public 
right.” (citing Utah v. United States, 284 U.S. 534, 545-46 (1932)).  “Ultra Vires” is Latin 
for “beyond the powers (of)” and means “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power 
allowed or granted by . . . law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1662. R 
163. See Randy L. Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly: Estopping the 
United States, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 41, 54-55 (1982). 
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF  AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1958) (“[A]pparent 
authority exists only with regard to those who believe and have reason to believe that 
there is authority.”) Indeed, apparent authority has often been labeled a misnomer, as 
in order for authority to be “apparent” authority does not exist at all. See Pitou, supra 
note 6, at 632-33. R 
165. See Urban Data Sys. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1147, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(quoting Yosemite Park & Curry v. United States, 552 F.2d 552, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1978) 
(“[T]he United States will not be estopped to deny the acts of its agents who have acted 
beyond the scope of their actual authority.”). 
 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE104.txt unknown Seq: 23  6-SEP-11 16:53 
2011] ESTOPPING BIG BROTHER	 185 
This is because if a government agent acts outside the bounds 
of his authority, he is effectively re-writing legislation to give him­
self authority he does not have.  Imposing an estoppel in these in­
stances would be tantamount to the court condoning this behavior, 
resulting in a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.166 
Stated another way, if the court enforces the unauthorized ac­
tion taken by the government agent, the court is recognizing the 
agent’s power to engage in the conduct upon which the private liti­
gant alleges he or she detrimentally relied.  Since this power was 
not given to the particular agent by Congress, judges that uphold 
this exercise are legislating to give effect to the agents’ ultra vires 
acts.167 
166. See, e.g., United States v. 18.16 Acres of Land, 598 F. Supp. 282, 288 
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (“Using the unauthorized actions of a government representative as 
the basis for estopping the government effectively circumvents a statutory or regulatory 
mandate, and can effectively waive a statutory or regulatory requirement.”). This mir­
rors the rationale in Richmond, but here the court is only sanctioning the acts of the 
government agent, who is the “legislations” drafter (although the ability to “draft” is 
enabled by the Court). Compare Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423­
25 (1990), with United States v. 18.16 Acres of Land, 598 F. Supp. at 288.  In a Rich­
mond situation, the court would be “writing” the legislation itself, for example, by im­
properly appropriating money, a power vested in Congress. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 
424-25  In other words, in a Richmond situation, the court is not excusing the acts of the 
agent, and allowing the government to recover resulting in a separation of powers viola­
tion, while in this situation the court is enforcing the effect of the agent’s ultra vires act, 
which similarly results in a violation. 
167.  See, e.g., Pitou, supra note 6, at 629. R 
Administrators are clothed with authority to act and make rules by the exer­
cise of legislative powers; and such legislative power is exercisable only by 
Congress.  It cannot be exercised by an administrator; no administrator may
 
do that which is  forbidden, nor exercise a power that was withheld. The fact
 
that a citizen was injured by his action does not clothe an administrator with
 
legislative power, i.e., with the power to assume an authority that has been
 
withheld or prohibited.
 
Id.	 Fred Ansell points out that: 
The application of the doctrine of separation of powers to estoppel against the 
government is straightforward.  If the government is estopped as a result of 
unauthorized government action, congressional power to legislate under arti­
cle I is undermined: in effect, courts would be refusing to apply the law as 
enacted by Congress because an executive branch official has misrepresented 
the content of the law to the citizen.  Estoppel would endorse the decisions of 
executive agents that are contrary to congressional commands and directives. 
The executive branch would be refashioning the law through its errors in indi­
vidual cases, thus contravening the separation of powers. 
Fred Ansell, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule of Equi­
table Estoppel Against the Government, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026, 1037 (1986).  Peter 
Raven-Hansen agrees: 
When a court imposes an estoppel, it sets aside the agency action taken in 
violation of agency law. The estoppel therefore may at least temporarily block 
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The threshold determination of whether the government agent 
was acting within his authority is often difficult to determine be­
cause courts use varying tests.  Some courts use an approach where 
an agent is authorized to do only that which is specifically delegated 
to him or her by statute, regulation, or warrant of authority.168 
Other courts use a more nebulous test that asks the question “is the 
agent’s action within the scope of his official duties?”169 
E. Lazy FC Balancing 
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch is a Ninth Circuit case in which 
the court of appeals allowed the government to be equitably es­
topped.170  In its opinion, the court attempted to fashion a workable 
test for when the government should be estopped. The dispute in 
Lazy FC was whether the United States was entitled to recover 
money erroneously paid to members of a ranch partnership.171  An 
agent of the U.S. Department of Agriculture informed the partner­
ship that they were able to receive payments if they divided opera­
tions so as to appear like separate producers.172  Government 
regulations at the time supported this, but the regulations were sub­
sequently changed to prohibit it.173  The ranch continued operating 
as it had before, and it kept receiving payments, which were part of 
a USDA program that allowed for payments to certain farmers for 
taking their land out of production, under the pre-existing arrange-
the agency’s enforcement of legislative policy against the party invoking estop­
pel, confer benefits on the party that are not authorized by legislative policy,
 
or otherwise give effect to an incorrect interpretation of the governing law.
 
The separation of powers objection to equitable estoppel of the government is
 
that a court, by estopping the agency in such cases, effectively “legislates” a
 
change or waiver of governing law or forces the agency to do the same, invad­
ing Congress’ exclusive constitutional authority to make law.
 
Raven-Hansen, supra note 128, at 1, 33-34 (footnotes omitted); accord Portmann v. R 
United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1982) (“One such justification invoked a 
separation of powers rationale; proponents argued that permitting equitable estop­
pel against the government would, in effect, allow government employees to ‘legislate’ 
by misinterpreting or ignoring an applicable statute or regulation. Judicial validation of 
such unauthorized ‘legislation,’ it was claimed, would infringe upon Congress’ exclusive 
constitutional authority to make law.”). 
168. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 420 (1990); Floyd 
Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 676-77 (1868). 
169. See, e.g., Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 681 F.2d 746, 
748 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
170. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1973). 
171. Id. at 987. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
187 
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ment.174  The USDA informed the ranch that this was permissible, 
and assisted the farmers in their application to the program.175 
Later, regulations governing this program had changed, making the 
ranch ineligible.176  However, the ranch continued to receive pay­
ment.  The government acquiesced, but later demanded a return of 
its money.177  The State Committee of the Agricultural Stabilization 
& Conservation Service determined that the partnership had not 
engaged in a scheme to defraud the government, and recommended 
that the partnership retain the payments received.178  However, 
even though the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to allow 
the ranch to keep the payments for equity reasons, he chose not to 
do so and the government filed suit.179  The ranch partners relied 
on an estoppel defense.180 
The court ruled that the ranchers were entitled to keep funds 
received, because ruling otherwise would lead to a serious injustice 
to the plaintiffs, and the “public policy of the United States would 
[not] be significantly frustrated by permitting the partners to retain 
the additional payments.”181  This marked the adoption of a balanc­
ing approach by the Ninth Circuit182 that essentially advocated 
weighing the amount of injury the government would suffer if the 
government were not estopped.183  The court explicitly stated that 
private litigants could evoke estoppel even if the government was 
acting in its sovereign rather than proprietary capacity.184  It did, 
however, state that courts should be more reluctant to estop the 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 988. 
181. Id. at 990. 
182. The court did not explicitly call it this. Id. at 985. 
183. Id. at 988 (“We think the estoppel doctrine is applicable to the United States 
where justice and fair play require it.”). 
184. Id. at 989. 
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government when it is acting in a sovereign capacity.185  Many 
courts have followed the Lazy FC court’s lead.186 
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THESE PROPOSALS 
The number of proposed situations in which commentators 
have suggested that the government should be estopped illustrates 
the difficulty in devising an immaculate test that would prevent in­
justice to private litigants while remaining sensitive to concerns un­
derlying the traditional no-estoppel rule.  Indeed, while many of 
these tests forward the interests of justice in a particular case, they 
ignore the public policy concerns behind the no-estoppel rule. 
Thus, there are serious drawbacks to all of these tests which will be 
explored in this Part. 
A. Proprietary Capacity 
The benefits of the “proprietary capacity” test are clear.187 
However, it suffers from a number of defects. For example, al­
lowing claims against the government when it is acting in its propri­
etary capacity will still harm the public fisc, as money claims would 
be paid out to litigants.  Also, although some courts interpret Rich­
mond differently,188 Richmond bars invoking the equitable estop­
pel doctrine when it may result in paying money to the private 
litigant.189  As already seen, actions involving property are likely to 
involve a financial component that would necessitate money being 
185. Id. The court also noted facts in the case that qualified as affirmative miscon­
duct, although again the court did not expressly use these words. The court stated: 
The partnership would not have entered into the soil bank program had it not 
been for the advice and assistance of [the USDA agent] . . . . At the time the 
partners entered into the contracts, even the agency’s published regulations 
arguably permitted this type of arrangement.  Moreover, not only did the part­
ners rely on the government’s approval of their contracts but . . . the Ranch 
requested permission to terminate the contracts.  At this time, the more com­
plete regulations had been published and it was clear that the arrangement 
was improper, but the government never apprised the partnership of this, and 
in fact refused permission to terminate the agreements. 
Id. at 989-90. 
186. See, e.g., Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Clinger v. Farm Serv. Agency, No. CV 04 424 E BLW, 2006 WL 581192, at *5 (D. 
Idaho Mar. 8, 2006); Dempsey v. Dir. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency, 549 F. Supp. 1334, 
1339 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Ex parte Four Seasons, Ltd., 450 So. 2d 110, 111 (Ala. 1984). 
187. See supra Part II.A. 
188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. R 
189. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423-25 (1990). 
 
 
189 
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awarded to the victor from the federal treasury, a result prohibited 
by Richmond.190 
Furthermore, because of the vast resources of the federal gov­
ernment the number of government contracts granted are much 
greater than any single private entity’s (such as Fed Ex) both in 
number and amount.191  That is, they are exposed to a much greater 
level of liability than any private entity would ever bear. The sheer 
mass of the government’s dealings would imperil the public fisc to 
an unreasonable degree under this approach. 
B. Procedural Estoppel 
Again, estopping the government when it fails to follow its own 
rules is a well-thought-out idea firmly rooted in logic.  However, the 
procedural estoppel rule is very limited in scope and application, 
and leaves ample opportunity for injustices to occur which may be 
as serious as if this rule were never invoked.  In effect, it rewards 
litigants who were fortunate enough to have the agent involved in 
their interaction violate a procedural rule, leaving those without 
this fortune wanting. 
Furthermore, this test assumes that government agents may be 
more culpable because they did not follow a promulgated rule or 
regulation, but this is not necessarily so.  It is hardly reasonable for 
every agent of the government to have knowledge of every rule in 
oft-voluminous regulation manuals. 
Additionally, imposing liability on the government through its 
agents could discourage candidness.  Liability for government 
agents flowing from faulty advice would discourage government 
agents from providing any advice at all.  When faced with a decision 
to either provide advice for which the government could face liabil­
ity or refuse to advise (or advise citizens to consult a document), 
the agents may choose the latter to protect themselves, especially 
when disregarding an arcane rule can be the source of the liability. 
Candidness is an attribute that people seek from a government 
agent from whom they want advice. 
190.  Id. at 424-25. 
191. In the 2009 fiscal year the government awarded $409,677,980,249 in con­
tracts.  USASpending.gov, http://www.usaspending.gov/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). Pre­
sumably, this number is actually much larger when money at stake is taken into account 
in contracts that are more informal, such as that at issue in Richmond. 
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C. Affirmative Misconduct 
The affirmative misconduct requirement is weak in that deter­
mining what conduct is “affirmative” (rather than passive malfea­
sance which would constitute negligence) is a difficult task. The 
line between what constitutes an “act” or “omission” is often 
thin.192  While in some areas of law this determination is unavoida­
ble, in many cases it makes scant sense for the hinges of justice to 
swing on such an unsteady ground. This should be evaded when 
possible.  Additionally, limiting liability to affirmative acts surely 
decreases findings of malfeasance.  This incentivizes weak decision-
making in the government by impeding government agents from 
proactively seeking to advise citizens, ultimately making their lives 
easier (and thus fulfilling their function). 
Beyond this, the affirmative misconduct requirement is deserv­
ing of little criticism unless used alone; it is not encompassing 
enough—an offense of which all current approaches are guilty. 
This test serves mainly as a means to limit the government’s liabil­
ity.  If this requirement did not exist, a government agent’s words 
could be misinterpreted by the citizen seeking advice, and that citi­
zen could act in a manner detrimental to him or herself while rely­
ing on this advice.193  A jury would likely find the citizen’s reliance 
reasonable because of the carelessness in which the advice was 
communicated.  The lack of an affirmative misconduct requirement 
would certainly subject the government to a high risk of liability in 
nearly every transaction between a citizen and a government agent. 
Of the proposed tests, the affirmative misconduct requirement is 
surely the most reliable, and has enjoyed widespread acceptance by 
the courts.194 
D. Actual Authority 
While the rationale behind this rule is that a government agent 
cannot perform acts on behalf of the government for which he is 
not statutorily authorized,195 the presence of this rule has the per­
192. See, e.g., Jacob Kreutzer, Note, Causation And Repentance: Reexamining 
Complicity in Light of Attempts Doctrine, 3 N.Y.U J. L. & LIBERTY 155 (2008); Arthur 
Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 547 (1988); 
Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor 
and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2002). 
193. Indeed, the Supreme Court warns about “real and imagined claims of misin­
formation.” Richmond, 496 U.S. at 433. 
194. See supra Part II.C. 
195. See supra Part II.D. 
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verse effect of subjecting unsophisticated citizens to injustice be­
cause of their failure to inquire into the powers of a particular 
agent.  While many courts hold that litigants cannot reasonably rely 
on statements of a person who has no governmental authority,196 
this too rests on the assumption that the litigant had reason to know 
or cause to investigate what the agent’s authority actually was. 
Weighing the equities, traditional notions of justice suggest that the 
citizen should not be the party punished for relying on statements 
of a government official, which in many cases could be conveyed 
over the phone, in mail, or in electronic mail. These media further 
the unlikelihood that it would even occur to a citizen that the per­
son with whom they dealt with was not authorized to act or advise 
as they did.  Even if the citizen exercised the utmost diligence and 
endeavored to determine the scope of the agent’s authority with 
whom they spoke, it would undoubtedly be a Herculean task.197  In 
fact, oftentimes the agents themselves may be unaware that they do 
not have the authority which they purport to have, further compli­
cating the ability of citizens to discover if the agent’s advice ex­
ceeded his or her authority.198 
E. Lazy FC Balancing 
The weakness in the Lazy FC balancing test is that it can lead 
to disparate results because the test itself provides little guidance.199 
This test requires little more than making an equitable judgment as 
a court would when judging a case litigated between private par­
ties.200  In an equity case litigated between two private parties, a 
court would consider the relative harm of the injury done to one 
196. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. R 
197. Courts show little sympathy to those embroiled in this plight. See, e.g., Fed. 
Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (“[A]nyone entering into an ar­
rangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he 
who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority.”); 
Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Min. of Def. of Rep. of Venez., 575 F.3d 491, 500 
(5th Cir. 2009); Augusta Aviation, Inc.  v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 449 (11th Cir. 
1982); In Re Estate of Hooper, 359 F.2d 569, 578 (3d Cir. 1966); Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Gordon, 244 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1957). 
198. See Monarch Assur. P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited 
by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is 
so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon 
his authority.”  (emphasis added)). 
199. Indeed, this runs contrary to the very purpose of the doctrine of stare decisis 
which is “designed to promote stability and certainty in the law.”  Hubbard v. United 
States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (1995). 
200. See supra Part II.E. 
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party versus the other, as well as the interests of the public at 
large.201  In effect, this test is nothing but a more lenient standard of 
the Supreme Court’s jus aequum rule.202 Lazy FC balancing is 
hardly different from the test the court espouses when it advocates 
that courts should “permit[ ] the estoppel defense against the gov­
ernment in cases where basic notions of fairness require[ ] us to do 
so.”203 
Furthermore, it is foreseeable that widespread application of 
this test would cause courts to cease being sensitive to the issues 
that created the no-estoppel rule.  What in individual cases may 
seem like a grave injustice may serve a greater social good when 
viewed holistically.  In their treatise on Administrative Law, Profes­
sors Davis and Pierce illustrate this problem. They state: 
[The Internal Revenue Service] is one of the federal agen­
cies that is most respected for its competence. Yet, each year the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) conducts a study of the tax­
payer advice provided by the IRS, and each year that study 
shows that IRS gives erroneous advice in somewhere between 10 
and 20 percent of all cases.  Some taxpayers are injured by reli­
ance on IRS’ advice, but millions of taxpayers are benefited by its 
availability.204 
Balancing the equities in instances where erroneous advice was 
given would inevitably favor the private litigant at some point if the 
Lazy FC test was commonly used.  As professors Pierce and Davis 
intimate, if these rulings adverse to the IRS became common 
enough, it would soon encourage the IRS to limit its advice or 
spend more taxpayer money on costly training. This would limit 
the valuable social good provided by the IRS; indeed, a service the 
citizenry demands. 
201. See Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 
U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1990)). 
202. Jus Aequum is defined as “law characterized by equity, flexibility, and adap­
tation to the circumstances of a particular case.” BLACK’S  LAW  DICTIONARY, supra 
note 2, at 461. R 
203. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973). 
204. K.C. DAVIS & R.J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 229-30 (3d 
ed. 1994). 
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IV. PLUGGING THE HOLE—A NEW TEST 
A. The Need for a Complementary Test 
The presence of the numerous tests that courts have developed 
for deciding whether to estop the government illustrates the diffi­
culty of creating a test that would result in the just disposition of all 
estoppel cases.  If applied alone, all of these approaches will inevi­
tably work substantial injustices.  Rather than have each test de­
scribed above function as independent “tests,” the separate tests 
should instead function as numerous factors to be considered within 
one test.  These factors205 must be balanced against one another as 
the particular factual situation demands.  They must not be applied 
in a vacuum, as if the options before the court are to follow the 
traditional no-estoppel rule or estop based on consideration of a 
single factor, as is the case in many courts today.206  Courts should 
apply each test with the other tests in mind, in order to create a 
“net” that would catch litigants as justice applied to their case. 
Considering these factors when deciding an estoppel case against 
the government would, when taken together, create an effective 
guide for courts to determine estoppel cases fairly. 
However, these factors alone are not sufficient to serve justice. 
In combination with these other views, courts should also consider 
whether the government’s actions allowed it to substantially under­
mine the core legislative purpose of the statute in question. This 
idea would create a multi-factor test that courts should consider 
when determining whether the government should be estopped: 
(1) whether the traditional elements of estoppel are present; 
(2) whether the government was acting in its proprietary or 
sovereign capacity; 
(3) whether the government agent broke or disregarded a rule 
that he was bound to follow; 
(4) whether the agent’s conduct was authorized; 
205. Proprietary capacity, procedural estoppel, affirmative misconduct, actual au­
thority, and Lazy FC balancing. 
206. For example, the Court refused to estop the government based on its proce­
dural capacity in Schweiker, when it could have considered the various other factors but 
failed to.  Note that the Court also considered whether the SSA’s conduct was an “af­
firmative misconduct” in Schweiker, but considering only two of the various factors still 
resulted in what surely would be considered an unjust result if the case were litigated 
between two private parties.  For example, if the Court would have engaged in Lazy FC 
balancing and gave weight to this analysis, it may have determined that even though the 
SSA’s agent’s conduct “fell far short” of what constituted estoppel under that factor, it 
may have concluded that the private litigant would prevail under the Lazy FC test. 
Failure to use all factors in the test will not save many litigants from injustice. 
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(5) whether the government employee engaged in “affirma­
tive” misconduct; 
(6) the egregiousness of the injustice that would result if the 
government was not held estopped; and 
(7) whether failing to estop the government would serve to 
substantially undermine the core legislative purpose of the stat­
ute in question. 
The core legislative purpose factor would require a court to 
consider the facts of the case at bar, and then ascertain the “core 
legislative purpose” of the statute.  If this purpose is substantially 
undermined by the failure to impose an estoppel, then the court 
should strongly consider estopping the government, subject to the 
application of the other factors in the test. The crux of the need for 
this test, much like the actual authority test, is partially based upon 
the separation of powers principles.  The reasons for only allowing 
the government to be estopped when its agent acts within its au­
thority are well-known and have already been covered exten­
sively.207  With these in mind, it makes little sense to fail to estop 
the government when an agent’s actions are not consistent with the 
delegation of congressional powers (that is, employing this “im­
proper legislation”) and their actions thus serve to circumvent or 
otherwise undermine the meaning of the statute as well. 
Ansell argues that estopping the government for the unautho­
rized conduct of its agent would lead to a separation of powers vio­
lation because the judiciary would be infringing on Congress’s 
legislative powers.208  He states: “If the government is estopped as a 
result of unauthorized government action, congressional power to 
legislate under Article I is undermined.”209  However, what Ansell 
and many other observers fail to fully appreciate is that, in many 
cases, failing to estop government agents acting within their powers 
likewise violates the separation of powers principle, even if not in 
the strictest sense, if the consequences of the agent’s actions sub­
stantially undermine the statute in question.210 
We are left with an interesting dichotomy.  The traditional sep­
aration of powers argument, explained by Ansel, Raven-Hansen, 
and others, is that an estoppel based on an agent’s misrepresenta­
tion made because of an agent’s mistaken belief or otherwise, can­
207. See supra Part II.D. 
208. See Ansell, supra note 167, at 1037. R 
209. Id. (emphasis added). 
210. See infra Part IV.C (discussion of Nagle and Dempsey). 
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not stand because it would be giving effect to an agent’s actions 
made pursuant to no authority whatsoever. This results in a cir­
cumvention, or a de facto supersession of legislative power.  How­
ever, under some circumstances, denying estoppel of the 
government also undermines Congress’s Article I power to legislate 
by frustrating the purpose Congress intended when it enacted the 
statute.211  The proponents of the traditional separation of powers 
objection to government estoppel is that it allows a result or action 
that Congress did not wish to occur, but in some instances, ignoring 
the broader purpose also actualizes a result Congress did not in­
tend. In fact, refusal to estop may produce an outcome that is anti­
thetical to the very reason the agency in question exists. 
Further illustration of this factor will be provided later, but 
preliminarily the facts in Schweiker provide an adequate demon­
stration of the application of the proposed factor.  Recall, in 
Schweiker, an SSA agent mistakenly advised Hansen that she was 
ineligible for social security benefits, and omitted to tell her to fill 
out a written application even though the SSA claims manual di­
rected agents to advise claimants to take such action. The Supreme 
Court denied estoppel, reasoning in part that allowing such estop­
pels would deprive Congress of enforcing its mandate that written 
applications be submitted.  The core legislative purpose factor 
would recognize what the Court ignored—that Hansen was sub­
211. The judicial system is a mighty chorus bellowing this refrain. See, e.g., Wade 
Pediatrics v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 567 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 
2009); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Courts 
generally disfavor the application of the estoppel doctrine against the government and 
invoke it only when it does not frustrate the purpose of the statutes expressing the will 
of Congress or unduly undermine the enforcement of the public laws.” (citing Trapper 
Mining, Inc. v Lujan, 923 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir. 1991))); Che-Li Shen v. INS, 749 F.2d 
1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that when a party seeks to estop the government, 
estoppel will not be judicially used to “frustrate the purpose of valid statutes expressing 
the will of Congress”).  Anecdotally, this reasoning is also prevalent in Massachusetts 
equitable estoppel case law. See, e.g., Risk Mgmt. Found. of Harvard Med. Inst., Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Ins., 554 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Mass. 1990) (“Estoppel is not applied to govern­
mental acts where to do so would frustrate a policy intended to protect the public inter­
est.” (quoting LaBarge v. Chief Admin. Just. of the Trial Ct., 524 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Mass. 
1988))); Langlitz v. Bd. of Registration of Chiropractors, 486 N.E.2d 48, 51-52 (Mass. 
1985); Weston Forest and Trail Ass’n, Inc. v. Fishman, 849 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2006) (ruling that estoppel would “frustrate [the governmental] policy”).  However, 
as this Note has explored, estoppel should be applied to government acts when to do so 
would promote a policy intended to protect the public interest. Cf. United States v. 
Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 761 (1st Cir. 1985) (“The possibility of harm to a private 
party inherent in denying equitable estoppel . . . is often (if not always) grossly out­
weighed by the pressing public interest in the enforcement of congressionally mandated 
public policy.” (citing Best v. Stetson, 691 F.2d 42, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1982))). 
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stantively eligible for benefits.  While Congress intended written 
applications to be submitted, the overriding purpose behind the 
SSA is that the people Congress deemed deserving of social secur­
ity benefits would receive them.212  While Congress did require 
written applications to facilitate accomplishment of this goal, it 
makes little sense to refuse to estop on the basis of preserving Con­
gressional intent on the facilitative policy while ignoring the larger 
legislative objective—to ensure delivery of benefits to those deserv­
ing.  One should not lose sight of the forest for the trees.213 
A statute is an embodiment of carefully crafted public policy 
that was the result of years of congressional hearings, findings, and 
research.  Rigid adherence to the traditional no-estoppel rule is 
sometimes tantamount to the court ruling the traditional reasons 
underlying the no-estoppel rule trump the legislative initiative re­
flected in a statute, something that, if not explicitly barred by the 
constitution, is looked upon with strict disfavor by observers of the 
judicial system.214  This is improper, and courts should exercise the 
utmost care to avoid this when handling cases concerning equitable 
estoppel against the government.  Judges here are making their own 
law, a power reserved solely for Congress.215 
Ansell and others believe that estoppels based on an agent’s 
ultra vires acts undermines Congress’s article I legislation powers, 
but when courts harm the statute’s underlying purpose, Congress’s 
power is similarly undermined because a statute, via its purpose, is 
an affirmative congressional proclamation directing government 
212. The first words in H.R. 7260, the Bill which became the SSA described its 
purpose as: 
An act to provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal 
old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate 
provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, 
maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their un­
employment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise 
revenue; and for other purposes. 
H.R. 7260, 74th Cong. (1935). 
213. Note, there are several different factors at play in this situation, this is why 
the  factors need to be applied in conjunction with each other.  In addition to the sepa­
ration of powers concerns discussed here, also related are the “procedural estoppel” 
issues, and there is a question as to whether this misconduct was affirmative. While 
some cases may require some applications of the individual tests (proprietary capacity, 
actual authority, Lazy FC balancing, etc.), others may involve applications of other 
such tests.  All of these concerns must be considered by the court. 
214. Even in the absence of a constitutional issue, a full analysis of which is ad­
mittedly outside the scope of this Note, courts should strive to maintain the congres­
sional prerogative whenever possible. See cases cited supra note 211. R 
215. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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agents to perform certain functions Congress deems socially and 
administratively desirable.  Ansel writes: “Estoppel would endorse 
the decisions of executive agents that are contrary to congressional 
commands and directives.  The executive branch would be refash­
ioning the law through its errors in individual cases, thus contraven­
ing the separation of powers.”216  The logic behind this reasoning is 
sound, and indeed it should carry the day in appropriate cases. 
However, it sometimes needs to give way when the larger legisla­
tive goal is being effectively circumvented. Failing to estop the gov­
ernment in these cases leads to ignorance of the congressional 
imperative, severely weakening the statute’s reach, force, power, 
and effect.  Rather than the executive’s mistakes broadening the 
reach of the statute, judicial ignorance of a statute’s core legislative 
purpose would unduly limit the congressional affirmation that the 
particular subject of the legislation is a social good that needs to be 
protected, or an evil that needs to be vanquished.  Such a constitu­
tional weakness mandates that courts consider the underlying legis­
lative purpose of the statute when determining whether to estop the 
government. 
As previously stated, the vast array of factual situations in 
which estoppel issues can arise would make the creation of any test 
that would promote justice in all cases impossible to forge. This 
multi-factor test is superior because courts will no longer singularly 
weigh one factor against another, but instead apply each factor to 
the situation and balance them as justice requires, resulting in less 
total injustice to litigants while remaining sensitive to the govern­
ment’s concerns.  However, the application of some factors is strong 
in all situations, and should be treated as such. The factor that gov­
ernment agents must have acted pursuant to their actual authority 
is sometimes treated as a requirement, and should be given great 
weight by courts for the reasons outlined above.  Absent the most 
extreme situations where the immense weight of the other equities 
pleads for estoppel, courts should require government agents to 
have acted pursuant to their actual authority in order to be es­
topped.  This is because, as previously stated, estopping the govern­
ment in these cases would enforce the effect of an ultra vires act, 
redefining the proper role of that agent.  However, this must be 
tempered by the “core legislative purpose” factor, and should, in 
appropriate cases, be given great weight as well.  Similarly, the af­
firmative misconduct requirement should likewise be given great 
216. Ansell, supra note 167, at 1037. R 
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significance, because doing so would address the concerns underly­
ing the traditional no-estoppel rule, namely, limiting liability. 
In many cases the basis of the litigant’s estoppel claim resulted 
in a slight to the litigant at the government’s hand.  Compounding 
injustice by a court’s refusal to enforce the Constitution’s separa­
tion of powers doctrine, or denying them a substantive right, is an 
even worse fate to thrust upon innocent litigants. 
B. Determining the Applicable Legislative Purpose 
The application of this factor necessitates explanation of how 
the “core legislative purpose” should be interpreted in order for the 
new factor to operate properly, including providing guidance as to 
the proper method of ascertaining the legislative purpose of a stat­
ute.  Legislative histories are often long and complex, featuring a 
voluminous amount of pages from House and Senate Reports, com­
ments from the floor, testimony given at and transcripts of commit­
tee hearings on the matter, and prior versions of the bill enacted.217 
As words are merely indefinite proxies for ideas, no definition 
can precisely capture what “core legislative purpose” means in 
every instance.  The “core legislative purpose” is perhaps best de­
fined as “the fundamental and irreducible congressional objective 
in enacting the legislation in question.”218  This definition is some­
what obscure, as it must be to remain malleable—an essential char­
acteristic of this test if it is to lead to optimally just outcomes. 
However, some ground rules apply. 
Delving deep into the legislative history to determine the pur­
pose of the statute is not necessary for this test and should be 
avoided.219  Instead, it is only necessary that one know the “core 
217. See Jennifer L. Behrens, J. Michael Goodson Law Library, Duke University 
School of Law, Research Guides: Federal Legislative History, DUKE LAW (2010), availa­
ble at http://www.law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/pdf/fedleghist.pdf. 
218. As Justice Holmes put it, “A word is not a crystal, transparent and un­
changed, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 
U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916)). 
219. Indeed, judges long opposed to the use of legislative history have had no 
difficulty determining the “purpose” of a statute. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Cal­
vert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396–97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possi­
ble the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face.  Laws are intended for 
all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what their 
rights under those laws are.  Here is a controversy which affects every little 
merchant in many States.  Aside from a few offices in the larger cities, the 
materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer who can afford 
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legislative purpose,” or as alternatively defined, the “general pur­
pose” of the statute. 
The terms “general purpose” and “core legislative purpose” 
are terms of art that are intentionally and unavoidably ambigu­
ous.220  It is impossible for a definition to be created that would 
convey to the court interpreting the maxim the same meaning with 
precision.  What is clear, however, is that “core legislative purpose” 
is different from “legislative motive.” 
A “legislative motive” test would act as a modifier that would 
broaden, rather than restrict the meaning of the test.  If “motive” 
were used, courts would view the test as examining the statute’s 
“purpose” rather than “core legislative purpose.” The result would 
neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing, or the cost of repeatedly
 
examining the whole congressional history.  Moreover, if he could, he would
 
not know any way of anticipating what would impress enough members of the
 
Court to be controlling.  To accept legislative debates to modify statutory pro­
visions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.
 
Id. 
Admittedly, today it is much easier for attorneys to access legislative material than 
it was when Justice Jackson expressed this view. What has yet to change, however, is 
the fact that legislative histories are often a compilation of dueling agendas, providing 
little guidance of the intent of a large and diverse body. 
220. Alas, legal terms are often inescapably vague, as they must be to apply to the 
multitudinous factual situations with which they are confronted.  As such, they must be 
read applying jus aequum to best effectuate their purpose. For example, see “miscar­
riage of justice” (often termed “substantial miscarriage of justice,”) defined as “[a] 
grossly unfair outcome in a judicial proceeding, as when a defendant is convicted de­
spite a lack of evidence on an essential element of the crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION­
ARY, supra note 2, at 1088.  While this definition appears straightforward, it is R 
undoubtedly subject to interpretation, as reasonable minds can differ as to what consti­
tutes a “grossly unfair outcome” or whether evidence was truly lacking in an element of 
the crime at trial.  Examples such as these are endless.  As such, modifiers are placed to 
serve as a guide to the unwary.  In the example above “grossly” is present to dissuade 
those who might be tempted to reverse a case on appeal for what they believe is merely 
a slight to the defendant, real or perceived.  Similarly, “core” legislative purpose, and 
“general” purpose serve this role.  These modifiers are meant to dissuade counsel who, 
by delving deep into legislative history, can argue that a statement made on the Senate 
floor proves conclusively that their interpretation is what Congress had intended. 
Additionally, they should not argue that such a minute piece of history affects its 
core purpose.  While a piece of legislative history might be indicative of one of the 
many concerns of Congress, its core purpose should be apparent long before it is dis­
covered.  Also weighing against this technique is that in reality members of Congress 
often make statements on the floor of their respective chamber to obfuscate the true 
legislative purpose with which they might disagree. 
It should be noted, however, that scratching the statute’s legislative history, may be 
helpful, in fact necessary to correctly determine a statute’s core legislative purpose, 
especially if the statute is not already well-known among legal professionals. What 
should be discouraged, if not barred, is the sort of outright excavation into legislative 
history materials described above. 
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be an unduly broad test that, instead of acting like the net catching 
litigants, would become a chasm in which they would fall. 
An unduly broad interpretation of “core legislative purpose” 
would lead to courts disregarding the test altogether.  It is unde­
manding for an attorney zealously representing the government to 
cobble together a patchwork argument that the government agent 
was complying with the statute’s “motive.” The word itself is so 
vague it can be contrived so that statutes can appear to have a mo­
tive that in fact they never had. 
Inquiring into the legislative “motive” would encourage attor­
neys to delve into the legislative history of the statute in question, 
as it is very difficult to ascertain a “motive,” even in a broad sense, 
without taking this step.  Moreover, it is simply too easy to find 
material to support an invented “motive” if the statute has many 
pages of legislative history.221  As stated earlier, even if the attorney 
finds the true legislative motive, in many cases it would be difficult 
to determine whether or not the government agent’s conduct ran 
contrary to this motive or not.  As such, a statute’s “core legislative 
purpose” at the very least must mean something more than the con­
gressional “motive” for enacting the statute. 
Without doubt, a statute’s core legislative purpose and true 
motive are related, and indeed in some cases may be the same. 
Most times, the legislative motive is reflected in the statute’s gen­
eral purpose.  However, this does not prevent them from being dis­
tinct entities.  Only the terminology “core legislative purpose” can 
set up the cognitive framework necessary to properly apply this 
test. 
C. Application of the Test 
Dempsey v. Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency provides a terrific example of how a court should determine 
the core legislative purpose of a statute.222  Dempsey owned a 
house in Arkansas that was insured against all “direct loss by flood” 
221. Indeed, safeguards may need to be in place to prevent the introduction of 
too much extraneous evidence entered to determine Congress’s intent. What may suf­
fice is placing a presumption against admission of that extraneous information to prove 
legislative purpose and forcing the burden on the party seeking to admit evidence to 
prove that such legislative purpose is multi-faceted or not commonly known before such 
evidence can be admitted.  Another route is asking the court to take judicial notice of 
the broad policy objectives that a statute wishes to accomplish. 
222. Dempsey v. Dir. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency, 549 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Ark. 
1982). 
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through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.223  During the 
time when his policy was active, a storm struck, causing severe 
water damage to his home.224  That very day he notified his insur­
ance agent who inspected his home and contacted the General Ad­
justment Bureau (GAB) to assess damage to Dempsey’s home.225 
During the course of the year, Dempsey continued contact 
with the bureau, which sent him a Proof of Loss form approxi­
mately a year later that determined Demspey suffered $918.17 in 
damages.226  The Bureau instructed him to sign it, have it notarized, 
and return the form.227 
However, Mr. Dempsey believed that he had suffered more 
damage than the amount claimed by the Bureau.228  He amended 
the form, claiming $7,711.27, and returned it.229  The Bureau re­
jected the amount, and paid nothing despite the fact that it admit­
ted it owed Mr. Dempsey the $918.17 in compensation.230 
The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Dempsey failed to file a valid Proof of Loss form within sixty days 
of the incident, a requirement to bring suit.231  The court estopped 
the government from making this argument because no Proof of 
Loss form was sent to him in a timely manner.232 
Notably, in making its decision the court examined the core 
legislative purpose of the National Flood Insurance Act.233  The 
court stated: 
To begin, the Court notes the government interests involved 
here.  The broad congressional purpose in establishing the na­
tional flood insurance program was to alleviate the personal 
hardship and economic distress created by flood damage by mak­
ing flood insurance coverage available on “reasonable terms and 
conditions” to those persons needing such protection which pri­
vate insurers alone could not economically make available. This 
Court must construe the provisions of the SFIP in light of its pur­
223. Id. at 1335. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 1336. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1340. 
233. The court did not expressly call it the “core legislative purpose,” but its anal­
ysis mirrors what would be the “core legislative purpose” analysis. Id. 
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pose to make flood insurance coverage available under “reasona­
ble conditions” . . . .  Given these purposes of the insurance 
program in general and the proof of loss requirement in particu­
lar, can it be said that failure to file a timely proof of loss will per 
se preclude recovery on the policy in a civil action? This Court 
thinks not.234 
Notice the court considered a variety of factors in reaching its 
decision.  Not only did it consider the core legislative purpose of the 
SFIP, but it also contains language that mirrors Lazy FC analy­
sis.235  Furthermore, in an omitted part of the opinion the court dis­
cusses the proprietary versus sovereign distinction.236  Moreover, 
the holding of the court itself, that the government was estopped 
because it did not mail the Proof of Loss forms within the statutory 
period in which a disgruntled citizen could bring suit, is reminiscent 
of a procedural estoppel. 
Additionally, had the court not held the government estopped, 
the Bureau’s negligence would have allowed it to escape an obliga­
tion that Congress clearly intended the citizenry to enjoy. The 
court would have, in essence, made a value judgment declaring that 
courts’ traditional hesitancy to apply estoppel against the govern­
ment was more important than Congress’s core purpose of the Na­
tional Flood Insurance Act, thus frustrating the purpose of that 
Act.  This is not only undesirable, but it impermissibly legislates 
from the bench by creating “de facto laws,” the “law” in this case 
being that if the Bureau wishes someone to not receive benefits to 
which they are entitled, they simply can refrain from mailing the 
Proof of Loss Form. 
234.	 Id. (citation omitted).  The court then continued: 
The Court finds that the injury to the plaintiff in this case would be great 
if estoppel were denied, while injury to the public treasury and weakening of 
the purpose underlying the proof of loss requirement would not only be small, 
but, if estoppel were not allowed, the public interest in compensating individu­
als for flood damage would suffer: a victim of flood damage would be unjustly 
precluded from being compensated contrary to the objective of the legislation. 
Id. 
235. Id. 
236. The court stated: 
This Court holds [that] . . . the government agency will not be permitted belat­
edly to assert a technical defense to a law suit which admittedly, if it had been 
in a state court against a private insurance carrier, would not have prevailed. 
The Agency was not in any sense acting in a sovereign capacity here but was 
engaged in essentially a private business. 
Id. at 1340. 
203 
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Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District is a more 
recent example where the dissenting judge explored the importance 
of the core legislative purpose underlying the Family Medical Leave 
Act.237 
School monitor Kathleen Nagle was hired at the school district 
in 2000.238  In January of 2004, her husband became ill.239  She re­
quested time off under the Family Medical Leave Act.240  The act 
allows any family member to take unpaid leave for a period of up to 
twelve months to care for an ailing family member, as long as they 
worked 1,250 hours in the previous twelve months.241  Nagle had 
worked only 554.242  She asked the district’s deputy superintendent 
(Frost) if she could be allowed to take FMLA leave despite this.243 
Though Nagle claimed he allowed her to, Frost says he did not.244 
However, since this was a summary judgment appeal, the facts were 
considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and her ver­
sion controlled.245 
Nagle took leave from January to April.246  She wrote Frost 
thanking him for his generosity in March.247  Once she returned in 
April, she met with Frost who again told her FMLA leave was 
available if necessary.248  Her husband became sick again in May 
and died in early June.249  Nagle took what she believed to be 
FMLA leave during this time period.250  She was then terminated 
upon returning to work in June.251 
Nagle sued, alleging a violation of FMLA by her employer.252 
The school responded that she was not eligible, and that she was 
terminated because her position was no longer needed.253  She ar­
gued that the school district was estopped from claiming she was 
237. Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 6-10 (1st Cir. 2009). 
238. Id. at 1-2. 
239. Id. 
240. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2009). 
241. Nagle, 576 F.3d at 1-2. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 2. 
253. Id. at 2-3. 
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not eligible because of Frost’s statements.254  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the school district, and Nagle 
appealed.255 
The majority affirmed the district court, stating that a case in 
which the government is estopped is “hen’s-teeth rare.”256  The 
court repeated the traditional reasons for refusing to estop the gov­
ernment, including concerns relating to a potentially negative effect 
on the public fisc.257  The court also pointed out that Nagle had 
nothing in writing from the school district granting her leave.258 
However, the court’s decision largely turned on the court’s unwill­
ingness to depart from Supreme Court precedent, which it read as 
hostile to estoppel claims against the government.259 
Judge Lipez’s dissent criticized the majority for admitting that 
the use of estoppel against the government is permissible, while 
again rejecting its use in this case for only the reason that the gov­
ernment is rarely estopped.260  Judge Lipez then pointed out that 
the majority’s concerns about applying estoppel against the govern­
ment generally are warranted, but there was little chance in this 
case the majority’s fears were founded.261  For example, the major­
ity feared the specter of endless liability if estoppel is allowed be­
cause of the volume of interaction between government agencies 
and the citizenry.262  Judge Lipez rejected this argument more gen­
erally by stating that endless litigation probably will not occur be­
cause the cost of litigation may prevent low-stakes claims from 
being filed, as well as the fact that judges can ferret out unmeritori­
ous claims at the early stages of litigation.263  Lipez then stated that 
there is an even smaller chance of precedent from cases like these 
254. Id. at 3. 
255. Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (D. 
Mass. 2008). 
256. Nagle, 576 F.3d at 3 (citation omitted). 
257. Id. at 5. 
258. Id. (“A prime danger in applying estoppel to the government is the prospect 
of he said-she said trials as to whether an alleged oral statement was ever made.”). 
259. Id. at 5-6. 
260. Id. at 6. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 5.  “To open the door to estoppel claims would only invite endless 
litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens, 
imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc.” Id. (quoting Office of Pers. Mgmt. 
v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 433 (1990)). 
263. Id. at 9 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
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spurring allegations because Nagle has evidence her allegations are 
true.264 
Most importantly, though, Judge Lipez reasoned that the use 
of estoppel in this context furthers the governmental objective that 
the FMLA serves to advance.265  In previous cases, like Richmond, 
litigants used estoppel to escape obligations.  However, in this case 
Nagle is using it to advance the precise reason the FMLA was en­
acted to ensure that sick family members get care.266  The Supreme 
Court sanctions allowing estoppel in “rare” cases, and these cases 
should involve litigants seeking to further policies underlying the 
enactment in question.267 
Judge Lipez’s dissent demonstrates that a government agent’s 
conduct that serves to undermine a statute’s purpose should give 
rise to an estoppel claim.  It is illogical to believe that an act con­
trary to a statute’s purpose that is given effect by a court’s refusal to 
estop does not damage the statute.  Acting contrary to a statute’s 
purpose is tantamount to acting contrary to the statute itself, by 
disregarding the will of Congress.268  When a court refuses to estop 
the government in this instance it impermissibly legislates, and the 
264. Id.  Nagle’s note thanking Frost for his assistance. Id. 
265. Id. at 7.  Judge Lipez found the FMLA’s core legislative purpose thusly: 
Allowing her to invoke estoppel against the government would not un­
dermine the policy of the act whose limitations she seeks to avoid. The Family 
Medical Leave Act . . . is designed, inter alia, to protect the continued employ­
ment of individuals-like Nagle-who need time away from their jobs to help 
family members confronting serious illnesses. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) 
(stating that the Act’s purposes include entitling “employees to take reasona­
ble leave for . . . the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health 
condition”). . . .  [A]llowing Nagle to pursue her claim advances the employee-
protective policy sanctioned by Congress when it enacted the FMLA. 
Id. at 7-8. 
266. Judge Lipez responded to the argument that the FMLA was not enacted to 
aid workers who worked less than the statutory number of hours: 
I realize that the Congressional cutoff for FMLA eligibility—1,250 hours 
worked in the preceding twelve months—is the product of a deliberate com­
promise that balances the needs of employees and their employers.” See 29 
U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3) (noting that the Act is designed to accomplish its purposes 
“in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers”).  But 
the explicit provision allowing more generous benefits under state and local 
law forecloses an argument that allowing estoppel here would contravene the 
federal law. 
Id. at 8 n.8. 
267. Id. at 10 (“The remedy sought does not violate federal law and, indeed, ad­
vances an important public policy . . . . These considerations justify Nagle’s invocation 
of the estoppel doctrine.”). 
268. See United States v. Freeman 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845) (“A thing 
within the intention of the makers of the statute is as much within the statute as if it 
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resulting decision weakens the statute by announcing it is permissi­
ble for the government to act in a manner prohibited by Congress. 
Furthermore, like enforcement of the actual authority requirement, 
it prevents litigants from suffering injustices at the hands of a gov­
ernment disregarding its supreme law.269 
While Judge Lipez performed valiantly in focusing on what 
might become the “core legislative purpose” requirement, it is a 
worthwhile experiment to determine how the court would apply the 
remaining factors. 
As stated earlier, the most important factors of this test are the 
core legislative purpose, actual authority, and affirmative miscon­
duct factors of the test.270  Did Frost’s misleading assertions to Na­
gle constitute affirmative misconduct?  In Kennedy, the Court held 
that a false statement made by a government agent to a citizen was 
not by itself an example of affirmative misconduct, even if relied on 
to their detriment.271  Nevertheless, Frost’s misrepresentation was 
likely not an isolated occurrence, and might have been construed as 
being an active pattern of ongoing misrepresentations, a construc­
tion which would categorize it as affirmative misconduct. 
Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true that Frost had authority to 
deny Nagle benefits—benefits she would have no reason to believe 
were within the letter.”); cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 
459, 461 (1892). 
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute . . . .  This is not the substitution of the will of the judge 
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a 
statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a considera­
tion of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enact­
ment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to 
the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to 
include the particular act . . . .  The reason of the law in such cases should 
prevail over its letter. 
Id.; Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The preference 
for plain meaning is based on the constitutional separation of powers—Congress makes 
the law and the judiciary interprets it . . . we generally assume that the best evidence of 
Congress’s intent is what it says in the texts of the statutes.”). 
269. For another example of the proper operation of the core legislative purpose 
test, see Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that although Washington follows the traditional no-estoppel rule, an excep­
tion should be made when the Washington Open Meetings Act (OPMA) is at issue 
because “these provisions of the Washington code demonstrate a strong legislative in­
tent that property held for the public use and benefit not be summarily disposed of 
without giving the public affected a significant opportunity to participate” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
270. See supra Part IV.A. 
271. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961). 
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she was entitled if not for the statements by Frost. These factors 
considered together tip the scale heavily in Nagle’s favor even with­
out considering the remaining factors.  However, they are weighed 
down even further by the fact that failing to estop the government 
in this particular situation results in a level of unfairness that of­
fends our notions of justice.  The proprietary factor is not applica­
ble and thus cannot be considered. 
The multi-factor test’s efficacy can be further demonstrated if 
applied to the facts in Merrill.272  In Merrill, the Court simply deter­
mined that the government could not be held estopped in the same 
way as private litigants, and pointed out that the farmers were re­
sponsible for knowing the applicable regulations published in the 
Federal Register, despite affirmative misrepresentations by the 
FCIC’s agent to the contrary.273 
If the multi-factor test was applied in this case, a fairer out­
come would have followed.  Taking each in turn, the traditional ele­
ments of estoppel indeed were present.  It is undisputed that the 
FCIC agent provided the farmers with faulty information, the farm­
ers acted in reliance on that information, and they did not recover, 
which was to their detriment.274 
Next, the government was acting in its proprietary capacity in 
this case.  The court gave little weight to this, but subsequent juris­
prudence has made clear that this should be considered for the 
aforementioned reasons.275  Concerning procedural estoppel, while 
it is questionable whether the FCIC agent broke its own rules,276 it 
is certainly arguable.  The agent failed to inform the farmers of the 
contents of a newly promulgated regulation. The agent unwittingly 
lied to the farmers, which can be viewed as affirmative misconduct, 
since it may have been reasonable for the agent to be aware of an 
important published regulation so vital to the advice he gave.  How­
ever, even if the conduct was not “affirmative,” the other factors 
militation toward estoppel could overcome this.  Concerning actual 
authority, it is true that the agent did not have authority to change 
this regulation, so traditional separation of powers argument would 
state that permitting an estoppel in this instance would allow the 
272. See supra Part I.A.1. 
273. See supra Part I.A.1. 
274. See supra Part I.A.1. 
275. See supra Part II.A. 
276. As stated previously, Schweiker is a better example of procedural estoppel. 
See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text. R 
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agent to unilaterally change the anti-reseeding crop insurance 
regulation. 
Perhaps this fact would be enough for some judges to refrain 
from going forward with estoppels.  However, this situation un­
doubtedly begot farmers suffering from long-lasting financial ruin. 
Indeed, the Court expressed sympathy for the farmers, stating that 
“[t]he case no doubt presents phases of hardship.”277  This was a 
hefty price to pay by the farmers for relying on advice from an 
agent employed to help them. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Court had no difficulty deter­
mining the core legislative purpose in the applicable statute, which 
was to prevent the exact sort of catastrophe that took place here.278 
This makes it a close case.  This both demonstrates the need, and 
shows it would be prudent for courts to adopt this multi-factor ap­
proach, as courts should make every endeavor to prevent grave 
injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has stated that applying equitable estoppel 
against the government is disfavored, but beyond that it has pro­
vided little guidance for lower courts.  As such, lower courts and 
commentators have fashioned a number of tests to determine in 
which situations equitable estoppel should be applied to the gov­
ernment.  All of them apply to their own particular factual situa­
tions, but there remains a natural reluctance to consider all possible 
tests when confronted with a situation. 
These tests should be viewed as factors within one test.  How­
ever, of these traditional tests, an important one is missing: whether 
the government agent’s actions served to undermine the applicable 
statute.  Each factor the private litigant can show should weigh 
more heavily toward estopping the government.  It is undeniable 
that the application of the multi-factor test will capture justice when 
it slips through the fingers of the status quo, as demonstrated by 
applying it to Nagle. 
Justice Holmes declared “men must turn square corners when 
dealing with the government.”  However, the more crucial and 
provident maxim is that the judiciary must turn square corners 
when interpreting the Constitution.  Failing to estop the govern­
ment when its agent’s conduct allows it to perform acts directly con­
277. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947). 
278. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. R 
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trary to the statute that they are charged with facilitating is an 
affront to the spirit of both ordinary statutes and the Constitution 
itself.  Only through ensuring that government agents’ acts are done 
in accordance with the core legislative purpose will it be certain that 
and a just result secured. 
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